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An Overview 
 
“Fwd: > > > Fwd: > > > Fwd: > > >  RE: LAWSUIT ! !  < < < < ” 
 
When you hear about service by e-mail, what do you think?  
“It looks like junk mail.”  “I haven’t check my e-mail in weeks.”  
“I’ll delete it and pretend I didn’t get it.”  “I don’t understand, 
this can’t be a real thing.”  
There are over 2.5 billion e-mail users in the world.1  What 
was once a novel personal method of communication has 
become a preferred method of business communication.  E-mail 
is entrusted with business contracts, airline tickets, medical 
records, bank statements, mortgage documents, and is 
increasingly relied upon by New York courts. C.P.L.R. § 308 
instructs how to serve process in New York State.  Although it 
does not expressly include service by e-mail, case law is 
evolving so that service via e-mail is increasingly accepted by  
New York courts.   
  This article will review New York’s service statute, 
C.P.L.R. § 308, in light of today’s culture and communications.  
Part One reviews the Constitutional framework of service, the 
statutory demands for e-mail as a method of service with 
appropriate leave of court, and provides an overview of the 
statute. Part Two reviews the evolution of New York case law.  
Part Three focuses on “how to” use C.P.L.R. § 308(5) to obtain 
service of process by e-mail.  Part Four contemplates the future 
of service via e-mail. 
 
1. THE  RADICATI  GRP.,  INC., E-MAIL STATISTICS REPORT,  2015-2019  1,  3 
(2015),  http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Email-
Statistics-Report-2015-2019-Executive-Summary.pdf. 
1
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Today, people are more mobile than ever.  Over 4.1 billion 
e-mail accounts exist worldwide.2 E-mail has become an 
integral part of communication between people, encouraged by 
its necessary partnership with social media, networking sites, 
and the desire to maintain a presence on the Internet.3 For 
many people, e-mail is a primary form of communication.  
Would it really be unfair to allow its use for the purposes of 
formally notifying someone that they are a defendant in a court 
proceeding? 
 
I. Proper Service Involves Due Process 
 
One of the first cases to permit service via e-mail was a 
federal case, Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink 
where the 9th Circuit found service via e-mail to be reasonably 
calculated to “apprise . . . [defendant] . . . of the pendency of the 
action and afford it an opportunity to respond.”4  While the 
Constitution does not specify any particular method of service, 
notice to a defendant is a fundamental requirement of 
constitutional due process. 5 
“In proper circumstances, this broad constitutional 
principle unshackles the federal courts from anachronistic 
methods of service and permits them entry into the 
technological renaissance.”6 Although communication via e-
mail and over the Internet is comparatively new, such 
 
2.  THE  RADICATI  GRP.,  INC.,  E-MAIL  STATISTICS  REPORT,  2014-2018,  1, 
2  (2014),  http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Email-
Statistics-Report-2014-2018-Executive-Summary.pdf. 
3. Id. at 3. 
4. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 
2002) (Discussing situation in which a hotel and casino operator brought a 
trademark infringement action against an international company that 
primarily operated through the Internet.  The only U.S. address provided by 
defendant was that of its courier in Miami, Florida. The business was 
designed to operate via the Internet and did not provide any permanent 
location. Only e-mail and a website were used for communication.). 
5. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) 
(“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”). 
6. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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communications have been zealously embraced within society 
at large and the business community in particular.7 
When authorizing service via e-mail, New York courts 
require compliance with New York State procedural rules and 
constitutional due process.  The state’s interest in bringing its 
citizens’ issues to final settlement must be balanced against the 
individual’s interest in the opportunity to be heard as protected 
by the 14th Amendment.8  While there is no specific test for due 
process, the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. proclaimed due process 
requirements from precedent and required service to be 
reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the 
action.9  Due process requires that the method chosen for notice 
be crafted with the purpose of actually informing the 
defendant.10 Service via e-mail may be defended on two 
grounds: (i) e-mail is reasonably calculated to provide notice of 
the pending action and (ii) e-mail is not substantially less likely 
to provide notice than the customary methods of providing 
notice.11   
 
A. Service of Process is Calculated to Provide Notice, Not 
Jurisdiction 
  
C.P.L.R. § 308 is a notice statute, not a procedural statute.  
The statute and case law strive to provide an opportunity to be 
heard, and the statute acknowledges that this is only possible if 
the defendant is made aware of the action. Under C.P.L.R. § 
308(5), the courts mandate outcome, not process. In this way, 
the law adapts to society’s changing cultural norms. 
 
B. The Evolution of Jurisdiction and Communication 
 
7. Id. 
8. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14. 
9. Id. at 314-15 (citations omitted) (“[N]otice [must be] reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the 
required information and it must afford a reasonable time for those 
interested to make their appearance.”). 
10. Id. at 315. 
11. Id. 
3
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Marching forward with technological advances, courts 
have permitted service through a variety of means.  In 1970, a 
district court ordered service of process via telex.12  In 2000 a 
district court permitted service via facsimile where the 
defendant refused to provide a permanent street address and 
only provided a permanent e-mail address and fax number.13  A 
federal court even ordered service via television where the 
plaintiff was required to provide notice to the defendant via 
newspaper publication and paid television advertisements.14 
Characteristics of the Internet were carefully considered by the 
court in Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 
where the court analyzed personal jurisdiction against the 
introduction of the sliding scale of website interactivity.15  
 
C. The Statutory Framework: Overview of Service of Process 
 
In New York State, C.P.L.R. § 308 governs personal service 
of process upon a natural person, which may be made by any of 
the following five methods: 
 
1.   “by delivering the summons within the 
state to the person . . .; or 
2.   “by delivering the summons within the 
state to a person of suitable age and 
discretion at the actual place of business, 
dwelling place, or usual place of abode of 
the person to be served . . .; or 
3.   “by delivering the summons within the 
 
12. See New Eng. Merch. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & 
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Telex, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/telex (last visited Oct. 
9, 2015) (Telex is a communication system where messages are sent over long 
distances using a telephone system and are printed using a machine called a 
teletypewriter). 
13. In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 718 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2000). 
14. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 
220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
15. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 
1997). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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state to an agent for service of the person 
to be served as designated under rule 318 
. . .; or 
4.   “where service under paragraphs one and 
two cannot be made with due diligence, by 
affixing the summons to the door of either 
the actual place of business, dwelling 
place, or usual place of abode within the 
state of the person to be served . . .”; or 
5.   “in such manner as the court, upon 
motion without notice, directs, if service  
is impracticable under paragraphs one, 
two and four of this section.”16 
 
Methods one and three are one-step processes of personal 
delivery.  Method two is a two-step process of delivery and 
mailing (sometimes mailing is to a different address than 
where the papers were delivered).  Method two is known as 
“leave and mail” service. Notice is left at defendant’s last 
known residence, usual place of abode, or actual place of 
business followed by mailing the summons within 20 days.17  
Service is complete ten days after filing.18 
Method four is a three-step process which is only 
permissible if you fail to accomplish service under methods one 
or two. It is commonly referred to as “nail and mail.”19 
Method five is the wild card under which the courts may 
devise service calculated to give notice to defendant where no 
other method of service under C.P.L.R. § 308 is possible. 
C.P.L.R. § 308(5) is a notice statute. It does not confer 
jurisdiction. It merely asks a party to “[p]resent a basis of 
jurisdiction, [and] an expedient order under § 308(5) may be 
 
16. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 (McKinney 2016).  For context regarding 
C.P.L.R. § 308(3): “A person may be designated by a natural person, 
corporation or partnership as an agent for service in a writing . . . .”  N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. § 318 (McKinney 2016). 
17. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(2) (McKinney 2016). 
18. Id. (“. . . . except in matrimonial actions where service hereunder 
may be made pursuant to an order made in accordance with the provisions of 
subdivision a of section two hundred thirty-two of the domestic relations law . 
. . .”). 
19. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(4) (McKinney 2016). 
5
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framed.”20 
A handful of recent New York State court decisions have 
embraced C.P.L.R. § 308(5) as the accidental hero for the 
evolution of a 45 year old service statute.21  When an attorney 
is in the unfortunate situation of being unable to effect service 
by personal delivery, “leave and mail,” or “nail and mail” then 
C.P.L.R.§ 308(5) allows the court, in its own discretion, to 
fashion a method of service upon ex parte motion and without 
notice,22 provided (i) the serving party must make an ex parte 
motion for expedient service,23 (ii) the court must be satisfied 
that service is “impracticable” under the specific provisions of 
subdivisions 1, 2, and 4, and (iii) the requested alternate 
service is reasonably calculated to provide defendant notice of 
the action against her.24 
 
II. New York Case Law Accepts Service Via E-mail 
 
Three New York cases analyze the use of C.P.L.R. § 308(5) 
to provide notice by e-mail. Hollow v. Hollow discusses the 
meaning of “impracticable” before determining that service 
under C.P.L.R. § 308(1), (2), and (4) were indeed 
 
20. Arroyo v. Arroyo, 351 N.Y.S.2d 536, 539 (Sup. Ct. 1974). 
21. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 (McKinney 2016). 
22. Id. 
23. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) is often referred to as both “expedient service” 
and “alternative service.”  Kelly v. Lewis, 632 N.Y.S.2d 186, 186 (App. Div. 2d 
Dept. 1995); Hitchcock v. Pyramid Ctrs. of Empire State Co., 542 N.Y.S.2d 
813, 814 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1989); Saulo v. Noumi, 501 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96 (App. 
Div. 2d Dept. 1986); Markoff v. S. Nassau Cmty. Hosp., 458 N.Y.S.2d 672, 
673 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1983); Liebeskind v. Liebeskind, 449 N.Y.S.2d 226, 
228 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1982) (expedient service). Simens v. Sedrish, 440 
N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1981); Giordano v. McMurtry, 433 
N.Y.S.2d 583, 584 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1980); Arroyo, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 539; 
Deason v. Deason, 343 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Prince v. Prince, 
329 N.Y.S.2d 963, 964 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (alternative service). 
24. See Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1968) (Consisting of 
three cases consolidated for appeal where plaintiffs sued for recoveries of 
personal injuries sustained in automobile accidents. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed three ex parte motions which permitted service by ordinary mail to 
defendants at their Pennsylvania addresses, service by publication in a 
Brooklyn newspaper, and service by mail to defendant's last known address 
in conjunction with delivery of copies to the insurance carrier.). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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impracticable.25 Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc, recognized that 
e-mail has become a customary form of communication and 
may, under certain circumstances, be reasonably calculated to 
provide notice of the action to the defendant.26  Alfred E. Mann 
Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L. found due process 
where the defendant had waived his right to statutory notice in 
favor of notice via e-mail.27 
 
A. Hollow v. Hollow 
 
Hollow v. Hollow, a divorce action, was the first case in 
which a New York court was asked to effect personal service 
via e-mail.28  Mr. Hollow left his marital home in 1999 and 
moved to Saudi Arabia where he lived and worked on a private 
company compound.  The only contact he had with his wife was 
through his e-mail account. Multiple attempts to serve Mr. 
Hollow failed due to the secure nature of the property and 
because he rarely left the company compound.29 
After several failed attempts at service, the plaintiff 
motioned the court for leave to serve the defendant via e-mail 
under C.P.L.R. § 308(5).30  Per the statute, the court first found 
that service under C.P.L.R. § 308(1), (2), and (4) was 
impracticable as plaintiff made reasonable efforts under the 
circumstances to effect service by employing an international 
process server and attempting service through the defendant’s 
employer. The process server hired by the plaintiff submitted 
an affidavit describing his various attempts to serve the 
defendant. Effecting legal service in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia was unworkable as it required government intervention 
and could take twelve to eighteen months to complete. Since 
the husband rarely left the company compound, in-hand service 
was virtually impossible. Serving a member of the security 
staff could result in the process server being arrested since the 
 
25. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (Sup. Ct. 2002). 
26. Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Civ. Ct. 2008). 
27. Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 910 
N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2010). 
28. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 705. 
29. Id. at 704. 
30. Id. at 705. 
7
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defendant’s employer refused to accept service on his behalf.31  
  After finding statutorily authorized service to be 
impracticable, the court next analyzed the Internet’s place in 
daily life and determined that while the question of serving 
notice via e-mail is one of first impression, the effect of 
emerging technologies is recognized by New York’s common 
law.32 
Satisfied that common law will accommodate changing 
technology, the court next reviewed cases that approved service 
via e-mail within federal law or other states’ laws. The New 
York court found that under appropriate circumstances, service 
via e-mail can meet the constitutional due process requirement 
of being reasonably calculated to provide notice and an 
opportunity to respond.33 
Ultimately, the court found that Mr. Hollow had made 
statutory service impracticable when he “secreted himself 
behind a steel door, bolted shut, communicating with the 
plaintiff and his children exclusively through e-mail.”34  While 
the court was concerned with the difficulty of verifying Mr. 
Hollow’s receipt of an e-mail message, a “constitutionally 
proper method of effecting substituted service need not 
guarantee that in all cases the defendant will in fact receive 
actual notice.”35  The court ordered service to Mr. Hollow’s last 
known e-mail address coupled with service by international 
registered air mail and international standard mail.36 
The court was right to find that service was impracticable 
under these circumstances. The plaintiff had attempted service 
at every known address, she made a legitimate and meaningful 
effort to locate the defendant, and access to the defendant’s 
residence was physically impossible. By choosing only to 
correspond with his wife and children via e-mail, the defendant 
showed that this particular e-mail address belonged to him, 
was used regularly, and that he received messages through this 
 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 707. 
33. Id. (discussing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 314 (1950)). 
34. Id. at 708. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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e-mail address.  If the husband can communicate out from this 
address, then the wife can communicate in. 
 
B. Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc. 
 
While the facts of Hollow v. Hollow are unique, the facts of 
Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc. are more routine. Snyder 
involved a breach of contract for services performed and 
expenses incurred by the plaintiff. Snyder analyzed the 
practicality of e-mail communications in daily life. The court 
permitted Snyder to serve Energy Inc. and its president, Peter 
Nelson, via e-mail as part of a customized plan for alternate 
service devised by the court.37 In Snyder the plaintiff submitted 
affirmations from attorneys, process servers, and the plaintiff 
to establish the impracticability of personal or mailed service 
on Energy Inc. and Peter Nelson.38  The plaintiff demonstrated 
that despite a rigorous search (which included subpoenaing a 
telephone service, utilizing people locators, and searching court 
dockets) it was unable to locate a valid home or business 
address for either defendant.39  The defendants had abandoned 
their New York and Connecticut addresses leaving no 
forwarding information.40 
Defendant Peter Nelson’s physical location could not be 
established, but the plaintiff did communicate with Mr. Nelson 
on a handful of occasions through AOL instant messenger and 
e-mail.  In demonstrating to the court its efforts to locate the 
defendants, the plaintiff showed that Mr. Nelson maintained a 
regular on-line presence with AOL Instant Messenger’s Buddy 
List.41 Days before making the motion to the court for alternate 
service, the plaintiff sent an e-mail to Mr. Nelson requesting 
his physical address. Although Mr. Nelson did not reply, the 
 
37. Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443-44 (Civ. Ct. 
2008); cf. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) (McKinney 2016) (governing personal 
service); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 311 (McKinney 2016) (governing service upon 
corporations); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 311(b) (McKinney 2016) (stating that where 
service is “impracticable,” service may be made as directed by the court upon 
motion without notice). 
38. Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 444. 
39. Id. at 445. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 447. 
9
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plaintiff received a receipt from AOL indicating that the e-mail 
had been read.42 
After determining that statutory service was 
impracticable, the court focused on the constitutional due 
process requirements of service and the realities of e-mail as a 
communication tool. The question was, can e-mail be 
reasonably calculated to give a defendant notice of a pending 
lawsuit?43 The court compared e-mail to three traditional 
alternative methods of service: publication of a summons in a 
newspaper, service upon a defendant’s family member or 
attorney, and service by mail to the last known address.44  Like 
these methods, there is no guarantee that the intended person 
will actually receive the message – service by publication is 
almost certain not to be seen and postal mail is never assured 
to make it into the hands of the intended recipient.45  However, 
Mr. Nelson’s conduct demonstrated that he could be reached 
via e-mail. His regular on-line presence and his previous e-mail 
communications made it reasonable that Mr. Nelson would 
receive notice of the pending action if sent via e-mail.46 
Snyder’s court-ordered cocktail of communications were 
adequate to quell concerns that an e-mail would be ignored, 
deleted, or caught in a spam filter. Court-ordered service 
included two e-mails with prominent subject lines, paper notice 
mailed to the defendant’s last known Connecticut and New 
York addresses, and a phone call to Mr. Nelson’s cell phone 
informing him that a summons had been sent by e-mail and 
regular mail.47  The court reinforced e-mailed service with 
other actions likely to attract the defendants’ attention. 
 
C. Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L. 
 
In a trust case decided on contract theory, Alfred E. Mann 
Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L. the court found that a 
person may contract away their right to statutory notice in 
 
42. Id. at 445. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 447. 
45. Id. at 448. 
46. Id. at 445, 449. 
47. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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favor of legal notice via e-mail.48 
Defendant, Roland Pieper a resident of the Netherlands, 
had signed as a personal guarantor to cover ETIRC’s 
obligations.49 When a suit ensued, Mr. Pieper objected to 
service upon him because it was e-mailed to him.50  Mr. Pieper 
had expressly waived all formal service for any actions that 
might arise out of the guaranty and had consented to receive 
such service by the same method as he received 
communications regarding the trust – by e-mail. 51 
Because the guaranty required Mr. Pieper to provide two 
e-mail addresses at which to receive all communications 
regarding the trust,52 the court found that “service of process at 
these addresses is, by definition ‘reasonably calculated’ to 
apprise Mr. Pieper of the action and thus comports with the 
requirements of due process.”53 
Here, e-mail is treated no differently than waiving your 
right to personal service in favor of mailed service. It was 
known that the defendant’s e-mail address was actually used 
because this was his official means of communication under 
this contract. Conceptually, allowing e-mail for service is little 
different than courts around the country utilizing e-filing 
where litigants agree in advance to accept court 
communications via e-mail.54  In Alfred E. Manning Trust the 
defendant had similarly agreed in advance to accept 
communications via e-mail. 
 
 
 
 
48. Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 910 
N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2010). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 420. 
51. Id. at 421. 
52. Id. at 420. 
53. Id. at 423. 
54. Attorneys and pro se litigants register for the website, provide an e-
mail address as a necessary means of contact and agree that this e-mail 
address is the primary means of communication for the case. See N.Y.S. 
UNIFIED CT. SYS., Filing by Electronic Means, 
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyscourtofclaims/efiling-
instructions.shtml. 
11
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III. How to Utilize C.P.L.R. § 308(5) to Authorize Service of 
Process by E-Mail 
 
A. Step 1: Make an Ex Parte Motion 
 
C.P.L.R. § 308(5) requires the party that is requesting 
alternate service from the court to make an ex parte motion.55  
Otherwise, service may be incomplete even where the 
defendant actually did receive the summons.  
In Badenhop v. Badenhop, a divorce action, the movant 
improperly requested alternate service with an order to show 
cause.56 The court stated that alternate service is to be 
requested by motion “and determined ex parte upon affidavits 
which establish that service is impracticable under 
subdivisions 1, 2, and 4 of that section.”57  In DeCarvalhosa v. 
Adler, an action to recover rent, the plaintiff served defendant 
at his mother’s house instead of at his residence.58 The 
Supreme Court erroneously approved this service upon the 
plaintiff’s cross motion deeming service sufficient under 
C.P.L.R. § 308(5) nunc pro tunc.59  The Appellate Court 
reversed the Supreme Court’s decision because C.P.L.R. § 
308(5) requires “that court-ordered” service be authorized only 
“upon motion without notice” even though the Appellate Court 
agreed that the statutory methods of service were 
impracticable under the circumstances.60  In Abshier v. Sunset 
Recordings, the plaintiff attempted service a total of seven 
times including once by e-mail. The judge denied such 
alternate service because the plaintiff failed to first make an ex 
parte motion.  The plaintiff only asked for such an order as 
part of her response to defendant’s motion to dismiss.61 
 
55. N.Y.  C.P.L.R. § 308(5) (McKinney 2016). 
56. Badenhop v. Badenhop, 444 N.Y.S.2d 112, 772 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 
1981). 
57. Id. 
58. DeCarvalhosa v. Adler, 748 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2002). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 756. 
61. Abshier v. Sunset Recordings, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 3227 (CM) (SN), 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119742, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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B. Step 2: Show that Service under All Other Methods is 
Impracticable 
 
 1.  The Meaning of Impracticable 
 
The meaning of “impracticable” in the context of § 308(5) 
depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.  
It is a situation where service under any other method would 
be futile.62 The purpose is to cure the unpredictable 
circumstances in which the plaintiff cannot adhere to the 
prescribed methods so the court is given discretion to fashion 
other means adapted to the particular facts of the case.63  The 
statute’s legislative history is helpful in understanding this 
 
62. Liebeskind v. Liebeskind, 449 N.Y.S.2d 226, 228 (App. Div. 1982). In 
Liebeskind, a divorce case in which the defendant-wife fled to avoid service, 
the court properly  ordered expedient service per C.P.L.R. § 308(5).  The 
plaintiff was not required to show that previous attempts at service were 
made.  The court’s opinion offers a robust explanation of impracticability: 
 
Simply because Special Term did not require plaintiff to 
demonstrate that prior attempts at service were undertaken 
is not error.  Subdivision 5 requires no such prior attempts.  
All that need be shown is that other means of service are 
impracticable. This the plaintiff did.  Nor was plaintiff 
required to demonstrate due diligence before resorting to 
service pursuant to subdivision 5. The only limitation 
contained in subdivision 5 is the requirement of 
impracticability of the other forms of service. In our opinion, 
the standard to determine compliance therewith is 
somewhat less than the “due diligence” as required by 
subdivision 4. Support for this conclusion can be found in 
C.P.L.R. 306(c), which requires that where service under 
subdivision 4 is undertaken, the particulars as to the 
attempted service under subdivisions 1, 2 or 3 must be 
detailed. In other words, due diligence must be proven by a 
showing of specific instances of attempted service. However, 
no such requirement exists for service under subdivision 5. 
Here the Court in issuing the ex parte order did fulfill all 
obligations imposed upon it. 
 
Id. at 228-29. 
63. Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1968). 
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purpose.64  
  Alternate service has no antecedent in the Civil Practice 
Act.65 Committee comments state “that a primary aim of the 
revision was ‘[t]o make it possible, with very limited 
exceptions, for a litigant in the New York courts to take full 
advantage of the state’s constitutional power over persons and 
things.’”66 The only limit to the court’s power, is its 
imagination, the facts, and the impracticability standard.67 
With alternate service as a tool, New York litigants are much 
more likely to receive notice and justice can find those who 
seek to dodge service. 
 
 2.  A Showing of Impracticability Requires Less than a 
Showing of Due Diligence 
 
For the court to order service of process under C.P.L.R.§ 
308(5), the movant must show that service under all other 
statutory methods is futile and thus impracticable. This of 
course, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.68  
Impracticable must not be confused with the more stringent 
standard of due diligence.69 
Impracticability does not require a showing that actual 
 
64. It should be noted that earlier versions of the statute require service 
to be impracticable under “subdivisions 1, 2, or 4” and later versions require 
“subdivisions 1, 2, and 4” (emphasis added).  This does not appear to change 
the analysis when showing impracticability. Additionally, note that cases 
before 1972 refer to alternate service as section four, because at that time the 
legislature added what is present-day section three, thus bumping alternate 
service down to section five of C.P.L.R. § 308.  Id. at 456. 
65. This is the predecessor to the Civil Practice Law and Rules 
(C.P.L.R.). Zimmerman’s Research Guide, 
https://law.lexisnexis.com/infopro/zimmermans/disp.aspx?z=1291. 
66. Id. (citing SECOND PRELIMINARY REP. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, N.Y. LEGIS.DOC., 1958, No. 13, at 37). 
67. Id. at 498. 
68. Simens v. Sedrish, 440 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1981). 
69. Kelly v. Lewis, 632 N.Y.S.2d 186, 186 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1995).  
David D. Siegel described impracticability as showing due diligence used with 
§ 308 subdivisions 1 and 2 plus the additional showing that service under 
subdivision 4 will not work either. Coyne v. Coyne, 443 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 
(App. Div. 4th Dept. 1981) (quoting David D. Siegel, New York Practice 81).  
There is no need to perform a statutory act of service if it would be futile and 
thus impracticable. Id. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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prior attempts to serve a party under each and every statutory 
method have been pursued.70  In Salesi v. Nieves, a wrongful 
death action, alternate service was granted where there was no 
need to show “prior attempts at service upon defendant, nor 
was ‘due diligence on the part of the plaintiff required.”71  
Plaintiff was permitted to mail service to the defendant’s last 
known address and to his liability insurance company.72  In 
Saulo v. Noumi, a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff 
successfully met the impracticability requirement by 
submitting affidavits from her attorney, the injured party, and 
the process service. The affidavits “detailed the repeated 
attempts to personally serve the individual defendant and the 
inability of the plaintiffs to determine his whereabouts despite 
substantial inquiry.”73 Although the defendant was never 
actually served, these affidavits showed plaintiff’s inability to 
effect service despite her substantial inquiry and repeated 
attempts.74 
In Tremont Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Ndanusa, an action 
to foreclose on a mortgage, the court held that prior attempts at 
service need not be shown to find impracticability. Here, 
alternate service via publication was deemed proper despite 
the defendant’s allegations that the process server had lied 
when he said service had been attempted on numerous 
occasions.75 
In Deason v. Deason, a divorce action, the only two 
prescribed methods of service,76  personal and publication, were 
deemed impracticable even though publication was never 
attempted.77  The Appellate Division upheld service via e-mail 
 
70. Tremont Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ndanusa, 535 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (App. 
Div. 2d Dept. 1988); see also, Hitchcock v. Pyramid Ctrs. of Empire State Co., 
542 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1989); Coyne, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 472. 
71. Salesi v. Nieves, 461 N.Y.S.2d 361, 361 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1983). 
72. Id. 
73. Saulo v. Noumi, 501 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96-7 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1986). 
74. Id. 
75. Tremont, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 9. 
76. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 refers to N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 232, which 
precludes the use of substituted service under § 308 subdivisions 2, 3, and 4 
in matrimonial actions. 
77. Deason v. Deason, 343 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1973).  A year prior to 
the present case, Deason went before the Court of Appeals, which ruled that 
the local government must bear the cost of service via publication for indigent 
15
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per C.P.L.R. § 308(5) because the court found service by 
publication was a burden on the county taxpayers where the 
wife proceeded as an indigent plaintiff and the defendant could 
not be located to effect personal service.78   
A plaintiff seeking to effect alternate service must make a 
showing that the other prescribed methods of service could not 
be made.79  This is often in the form of affidavits from 
attorneys, plaintiffs, and process servers.  In Simens v. Sedrish, 
the plaintiff assumed she would have difficulty serving the 
defendant because her predecessor in interest had difficulty in 
effecting service. The plaintiff served the defendant via e-mail 
then made an application to the court for an order authorizing 
such service, nunc pro tunc.  The application was denied 
because nothing in the record “indicated what steps, if any, 
plaintiff had initiated on her own behalf to effect service 
pursuant to the prescribed methods, and why those methods 
proved impracticable.”80 Thus, without sufficient evidence, a 
motion for alternate service will be denied.81 Impracticability 
requires a factual showing that may be presented with 
affidavits, receipts, search records, and cost analysis that 
 
plaintiffs so as not to deny access to the courts in violation of the 14th 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Deason v. Deason, 296 N.E.2d 229, 230 
(N.Y. 1973).  To reduce the cost to the local government, and because service 
pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) may only be granted upon a motion, the 
New York Court of Appeals invited the parties to apply for a determination if 
judicially devised service under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) is permissible instead 
of service by publication. Id. 
78. Deason, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 278-79.  Plaintiff and the county joined in 
an ex parte motion requesting to serve defendant by mailing the summons to 
the homes of defendant’s mother and his sister.  Id.  The court granted the 
motion, finding that although not every single method of service was 
attempted, plaintiff had exhausted all other reasonable possibilities of 
statutory service, noting that N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 and N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 
232 preclude the use of substituted service under subdivisions 2, 3, and 4 in 
matrimonial actions. 
79. Simens v. Sedrish, 440 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1981); 
see Coyne v. Coyne, 443 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1981) (“[A] 
factual foundation precisely specifying time, when, place where and methods 
used to satisfy the service requirements must be spelled out from supporting 
affidavits of those with first-hand knowledge.  A showing that is merely 
inconvenient . . . is not sufficient to meet the statutory test of 
‘impracticable.’”). 
80. Simens, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 688. 
81. Coyne, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 472. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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service by the other prescribed methods is futile. 
 
C. Step 3: Demonstrate that Service Is Reasonably Calculated 
to Provide Notice 
 
In order to protect a defendant’s 14th Amendment right of 
due process, service of process must provide notice reasonably 
calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.82   
Because there is no precise test for this constitutional 
requirement,83 courts scrutinize the facts of each situation to 
determine if the prescribed method of service will reasonably 
provide a defendant notice of the litigation. In Phillip Morris 
USA Inc. v. Veles, Ltd., the defendant’s business appeared to be 
conducted entirely through electronic communications because 
it only operated online stores and no physical addresses were 
posted on its websites.84  Similarly, in Chanel, Inc. v. Zhixian,  
the defendant operated an entirely online business without 
disclosing its physical location.85 In each case the plaintiffs 
showed that service by e-mail was likely to reach the 
defendants. In Phillip Morris, the “plaintiff had amply 
demonstrated the high likelihood that the defendants would 
receive and respond to e-mail communications” by showing that 
the defendants conducted their business extensively through 
their website and that they regularly correspond with 
customers via e-mail. 86  In Chanel, Inc., the court found that e-
mails had presumptively reached the defendant because 
numerous e-mails sent to an e-mail address provided by 
defendant had not bounced back.87  
Showing a course of conduct that parties communicated via 
 
82. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 
83. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
84. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 06 CV 2988 GBD, 2007 WL 
725412, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007). 
85. Chanel, Inc. v. Zhixian, No. 10-CV-60585, 2010 WL 1740695, at *1 
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2010). 
86. Philip Morris, No. 06 CV 2988 GBD, 2007 WL 725412, at *3. 
87. Chanel, Inc.,  10-CV-60585, 2010 WL 1740695, at *3. 
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e-mail supports a finding that e-mail service is reasonably 
calculated to notify a defendant of an action against her. In 
Safadjou v. Mohammadi, a divorce case, the record showed 
that the parties had been communicating via e-mail for several 
months through the e-mail addresses that were on record.88  
Additionally, the defendant acknowledged receiving e-mails 
from the plaintiff’s attorney which were sent to the same e-mail 
address.89 
 
IV. Service by E-Mail is a Valuable Tool for New York Courts 
 
Although service of process by e-mail is increasingly 
authorized by the courts under C.P.L.R. § 308(5), this type of 
service still raises concerns.  E-mail is treated as a casual form 
of communication. There is no guarantee that an e-mail will 
reach its intended recipient. Spam filters may sweep it away, it 
may be deleted, or be merely overlooked in a crowded inbox.  
Unlike a signed postal receipt, there is no affirmative 
acknowledgement by the intended recipient that the message 
was received.  A return receipt will be initiated by any person 
who happens to open the e-mail.   
Courts recognize these afflictions and generally refuse to 
allow such excuses. Similarly, courts discourage the lazy 
plaintiff by requiring a finding that service by statutory means 
is impracticable. The constitutional requirement of “reasonably 
calculated to provide notice” permits courts to do everything in 
their power to reach defendants. Such practices include follow-
ups via telephone, text message, publication, and postal mail.  
In their exercises of judicial discretion, courts thus far have not 
relied solely on e-mail service so that neither the oblivious 
defendant nor the nefarious defendant can avoid justice.   
  However, e-mail should not be treated as a primary means 
of notice.  The facts of how people use e-mail create too great a 
risk.  People frequently e-mail the wrong recipient and some e-
mail accounts are only reluctantly used. Those seeking to evade 
service can apply filters and block senders or they can change 
 
88. Safadjou v. Mohammadi, 964 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803-04 (App. Div. 4th 
Dept. 2013). 
89. Id. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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e-mail addresses every few weeks. The drafters of the C.P.L.R. 
contemplated that service will occasionally fail to actually 
notify defendant.90 This hazard comes with all methods of 
service, not just e-mail. The C.P.L.R. provides a remedy by 
allowing a person “to defend [an] action within one year” after 
she knows a final judgment is against her.91  In this way, an 
oblivious defendant may still be heard even after a final 
judgment. The risks of adding e-mail into our regular tool box 
for notice are adequately addressed within the C.P.L.R.  
Service via e-mail is gaining traction as an appropriate method 
of alternate service. 
The benefits of e-mailed service far outweigh the risks so 
long as the court continues to direct other safeguards to 
maximize notice to the defendant. With adherence to C.P.L.R. § 
308(5)’s three-part test, e-mail will continue to provide a 
valuable and efficient service to New York’s justice system. 
 
“< < < < < < < <  < < < <Message Deleted> > > > > > > > > > >” 
 
 
90. Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d, 451 (N.Y. 1968) (discussing N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. § 317). 
91. Id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 317). 
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